Do Firms' Owners Delegate both Short-Run and Long-Run Decisions to Their Managers in Equilibrium?
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsStrategic Delegation; Oligopoly; R&D Investments; Equilibrium Delegation Schemes;
- C20 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-06-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-IPR-2008-06-21 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2008-06-21 (Microeconomics)
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