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Taxes and Decision Rights in Multinationals

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Nielsen, Søren Bo

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, taxes, transfer prices, MNEs. JEL-Classification: H25, F23, L23.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7509
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Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07-2006.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2006
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2006_007
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
Email:


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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
  • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
  • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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  1. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 306-325, April.
  2. S¯ren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-M¯ller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 419-437, 04.
  3. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons From Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(2), pages 305-322, June.
  4. Charles E. Hyde & Chongwoo Choe, 2005. "Keeping Two Sets of Books: The Relationship Between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 165-186, 03.
  5. Nielsen, Søren Bo & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2010. "Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 121-132, January.
  6. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
  7. Alfons Weichenrieder, 1996. "Fighting international tax avoidance," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(1), pages 37-58, February.
  8. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
  9. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
  10. Elitzur, Ramy & Mintz, Jack, 1996. "Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 401-422, June.
  11. Thomas A. Gresik, 2001. "The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 800-838, September.
  12. Sanna-Randaccio, Francesca & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 2002. "Multinational Knowledge Spillovers with Centralized versus Decentralized R&D: A Game Theoretic Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Kant, Chander, 1988. "Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 147-157, February.
  14. Hines, James R. Jr., 1999. "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 305-22, June.
  15. Guttorm Schjelderup & Lars Sorgard, 1997. "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(3), pages 277-290, July.
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Cited by:

  1. Michael P. Devereux & Christian Keuschnigg, 2009. "The Distorting Arm’s Length Principle," Working Papers 0910, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  2. Arnt Ove Hopland & Petro Lisowsky & Mohammed Mardan & Dirk Schindler, 2014. "Income Shifting under Losses," CESifo Working Paper Series 5130, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Keuschnigg, Christian & Devereux, Michael P., 2013. "The arm's length principle and distortions to multinational firm organization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 432-440.
  4. Koethenbuerger, Marko & Stimmelmayr, Michael, 2016. "Taxing multinationals in the presence of internal capital markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 58-71.
  5. Hayley Reynolds & Ludvig Wier, 2016. "Estimating profit shifting in South Africa using firm-level tax returns," WIDER Working Paper Series 128, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  6. Søren Bo Nielsen, 2014. "Transfer Pricing: Roles and Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series 4694, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Hayato Kato & Hirofumi Okoshi, 2017. "Production Location of Multinational Firms under Transfer Pricing: The Impact of the Arm's Length Principle," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2017-016, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
  8. Lemus, A., 2011. "Strategic incentives for kepping one set of books under the Arm's Length Principle," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1135, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  9. Jan Thomas Martini & Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2007. "Transfer Pricing or Formula Apportionment? Tax-Induced Distortions of Multinationals’ Investment and Production Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2020, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Jie Ma & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, 2015. "Competition for FDI and Profit Shifting," CESifo Working Paper Series 5153, CESifo Group Munich.

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