Endogenous Managerial Incentive Contracts in a Differentiated Duopoly, With and Without Commitment
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- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2010. "Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(8), pages 531-543, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ya-Chin Wang, 2013. "Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(4), pages 605-624, December.
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- Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Managerial compensation contracts in quantity-setting duopoly," Working Papers 2012/17, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
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"Managerial delegation schemes in a duopoly with endogenous production costs: a comparison of sales and relative profit delegation under centralised unionisation,"
2012/137, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
- Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Managerial Delegation Schemes in a Duopoly with Endogenous Production Costs: A Comparison of Sales and Relative Profit Delegation under Centralised Unionisation," Working Paper series 44_12, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- Zheng Wang, 2015. "Delegation and Vertical Externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1128-1135.
- Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Manasakis, Constantine & Mitrokostas, Evangelos & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 205-217.
- Domenico De Giovanni & Fabio Lamantia, 2016. "Control delegation, information and beliefs in evolutionary oligopolies," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(5), pages 1089-1116, December.
- repec:bla:manchs:v:85:y:2017:i:3:p:282-294 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2015. "Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 546-567, September.
More about this item
KeywordsOligopoly; Managerial delegation; Endogenous contracts;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-07-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2009-07-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2009-07-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2009-07-03 (Microeconomics)
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