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Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly

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  • Werner Neus
  • Manfred Stadler

Abstract

We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Neus & Manfred Stadler, 2018. "Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(7), pages 814-820, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:7:p:814-820
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.2964
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    Cited by:

    1. Stadler Manfred & Unsorg Maximiliane, 2022. "Manager Delegation, Owner Coordination and Firms’ Investment in Automation," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 73(2), pages 159-182, August.
    2. Neus, Werner & Stadler, Manfred, 2022. "The tragedy of the common holdings: Coordination strategies and product market competition," University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics 154, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, School of Business and Economics.
    3. Werner Neus & Manfred Stadler & Maximiliane Unsorg, 2020. "Market structure, common ownership, and coordinated manager compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1262-1268, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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