On price competition with market share delegation contracts
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Other versions of this item:
- Michael Kopel & Luca Lambertini, 2013. "On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(1), pages 40-43, January.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ritz, Robert A., 2008. "Strategic incentives for market share," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 586-597, March.
- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2010.
"Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment,"
Managerial and Decision Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(8), pages 531-543, December.
- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2009. "Endogenous Managerial Incentive Contracts in a Differentiated Duopoly, With and Without Commitment," Working Papers 0905, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
- Berr, Fabian, 2011. "Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(2), pages 251-262, July.
- Miller, Nolan H & Pazgal, Amit I, 2001. "The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 284-301, Summer.
- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
- Lambertini, Luca & Trombetta, Marco, 2002. "Delegation and firms' ability to collude," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 359-373, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- A. Mahathi & Rupayan Pal & Vinay Ramani, 2016.
"Competition, strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption,"
Economics of Innovation and New Technology,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 143-171, March.
- A. Mahati & Rupayan Pal, 2013. "Competition, strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-016, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:278:y:2019:i:3:p:809-820 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stadler, Manfred & Neus, Werner, 2018. "Cross Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly," Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181534, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Neus, Werner & Stadler, Manfred, 2018. "Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 109, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
More about this item
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2012-02-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-02-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-02-01 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2012-02-01 (Microeconomics)
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