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Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment

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Listed:
  • Constantine Manasakis
  • Evangelos Mitrokostas
  • Emmanuel Petrakis

Abstract

In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contracts. For intermediate levels of product substitutability, they use Market Share contracts. When owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each type is an owner's best response to his rival's choice. Product substitutability has differential effects on output levels and profits, depending on the configuration of contracts in the industry. Finally, managerial incentive contracts are welfare enhancing if they increase consumers' surplus. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2010. "Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(8), pages 531-543, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:531-543
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1507
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Meccheri & Luciano Fanti, 2012. "Managerial Delegation Schemes in a Duopoly with Endogenous Production Costs: A Comparison of Sales and Relative Profit Delegation under Centralised Unionisation," Working Paper series 44_12, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    2. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014. "Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.
    3. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2015. "Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 546-567, September.
    4. Jumpei Hamamura & Sho Hayakawa, 2024. "Optimal choice of relative performance indicator and product market competition," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 112-121.
    5. Ya-Chin Wang, 2013. "Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(4), pages 605-624, December.
    6. Choi Kangsik & Lee Ki-Dong & Lim Seonyoung, 2020. "Managerial Delegation of Competing Vertical Chains with Vertical Externality," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-18, June.
    7. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Manasakis, Constantine & Mitrokostas, Evangelos & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 205-217.
    8. Jumpei Hamamura & Vinay Ramani, 2023. "Social performance versus relative performance evaluation, asymmetric costs, and quantity competition under managerial delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1706-1719, April.
    9. John S. Heywood & Zerong Wang & Guangliang Ye, 2022. "Strategic delegation in an international mixed oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1888-1898, September.
    10. Zheng Wang, 2015. "Delegation and Vertical Externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1128-1135.
    11. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2018. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Bonus Systems," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 4(2), pages 349-365, July.
    12. Jumpei Hamamura, 2021. "What level do disadvantaged firms weight rivals' profits in relative performance evaluations under quantity competition?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 493-501, March.
    13. Lisa Planer-Friedrich & Marco Sahm, 2018. "Why Firms Should Care for All Consumers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1603-1612.
    14. Aitor Ciarreta & Javier García†Enríquez, 2018. "Profitable Strategic Delegation With Conjectural Variations," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 185-203, April.
    15. Michael Kopel & Anna Ressi & Luca Lambertini, 2017. "Capturing Direct and Cross Price Effects in a Differentiated Products Duopoly Model," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(3), pages 282-294, June.
    16. Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Managerial compensation contracts in quantity-setting duopoly," Working Papers 2012/17, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    17. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2010. "Labour Incentive Schemes in a Cournot Duopoly with Simple Institutional Constraints," Working Paper series 38_10, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    18. Chen, Tai-Liang & Yang, Mingjie, 2024. "Brand loyalty, managerial delegation and position choices: Bertrand versus Cournot competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    19. Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2021. "Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 120-133, January.
    20. Jumpei Hamamura, 2022. "Weight assigned to a rival's profit by an advantaged firm in relative performance evaluation with Cournot–Bertrand competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2838-2844, October.
    21. John S. Heywood & Zheng Wang, 2020. "Delivered pricing and endogenous delegation of contract type," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 232-249, September.
    22. Michael Kopel & Luca Lambertini, 2013. "On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(1), pages 40-43, January.
    23. Chirco, Alessandra & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2013. "Choosing price or quantity? The role of delegation and network externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 482-486.
    24. Leonard F. S. Wang, 2020. "Relative Performance Versus Market Share Delegation in a Vertically Related Market," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 19(1), pages 16-27, June.
    25. Domenico De Giovanni & Fabio Lamantia, 2016. "Control delegation, information and beliefs in evolutionary oligopolies," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(5), pages 1089-1116, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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