Labour incentive schemes in a Cournot duopoly with simple institutional constraints
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Other versions of this item:
- Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2010. "Labour Incentive Schemes in a Cournot Duopoly with Simple Institutional Constraints," Working Paper series 38_10, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
References listed on IDEAS
- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2010.
"Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment,"
Managerial and Decision Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(8), pages 531-543, December.
- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2009. "Endogenous Managerial Incentive Contracts in a Differentiated Duopoly, With and Without Commitment," Working Papers 0905, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
- Giuseppe Nicoletti & Andrea Bassanini & Ekkehard Ernst & Sébastien Jean & Paulo Santiago & Paul Swaim, 2001. "Product and Labour Markets Interactions in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 312, OECD Publishing.
- Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Endogenous Strategic Managerial Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 0706, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsCournot duopoly; principal-agent model; relative performance evaluation; institutional constraints.;
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-12-04 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-12-04 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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