Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism
Can managers' personality traits be of use to profit maximizing firm owners? We investigate the case where managers have a variety of attitudes toward relative performance that are indexed by their type. We consider two stage games where profit maximizing owners select managers in the first stage, and these managers, knowing each other's types, compete in a duopoly game in the second stage. The equilibria of various types of competition are derived and comparisons are made to the standard case where managers are profit maximizers. We show that managers' types can be used as a strategic commitment device that can increase firm profits in certain environments. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 23 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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