Port Competition and Welfare Effect of Strategic Privatization
Private operation of port facilities is becoming increasingly common worldwide and many governments consider the privatization of public ports as a policy option. We investigate the effect of port privatization in a setting with two ports located in different countries, serving their home market but also competing for transshipment traffic from a third region. Each government chooses whether to privatize its port or to keep port operations public. We show that there exist equilibria in which the two governments choose privatization. In these equilibria, national welfare is higher relative to a situation where both ports are public. Since port charges are strategic complements, privatization can act as a valuable precommitment tool for the two governments and allows for a better exploitation of the third region. However, from the perspective of maximizing the joint national welfare of both port countries, there is an inefficiently low incentive to privatize. It is also shown that a country with a smaller home market has a larger incentive to choose private port operation.
|Date of creation:||24 Jan 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Vogelsanger Str. 321, Alte Wagenfabrik, 50827 Köln|
Phone: ++ 49 (0) 221 277 29 100
Fax: ++ 49 (0) 221 277 29 400
Web page: http://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2012.
"Airport Privatization And International Competition,"
The Japanese Economic Review,
Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(4), pages 431-450, December.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2010. "Airport privatization and international competition," ISER Discussion Paper 0792, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-559, August.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd & Ehud Kalai, 1990. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," Discussion Papers 879, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mantin, Benny, 2012. "Airport complementarity: Private vs. government ownership and welfare gravitation," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 381-388.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Managerial incentives and collusive behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1501-1523, August.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 4506, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- R. Midoro & E. Musso & F. Parola *, 2005. "Maritime liner shipping and the stevedoring industry: market structure and competition strategies," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(2), pages 89-106, April.
- Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
- Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economics Working Papers 91-172, University of California at Berkeley.
- Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Christopher M. Anderson & Yong-An Park & Young-Tae Chang & Chang-Ho Yang & Tae-Woo Lee & Meifeng Luo, 2008. "A game-theoretic analysis of competition among container port hubs: the case of Busan and Shanghai 1," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(1), pages 5-26, February.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
- De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "Transport policy competition between governments: A selective survey of the literature," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 35-48.
- DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, 2012. "Transport policy competition between governments: A selective survey of the literature," Working Papers 2012014, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender, 2008. "Private Port Pricing and Public Investment in Port and Hinterland Capacity," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 42(3), pages 527-561, September.
- DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef & VAN DENDER, Kurt, 2007. "Private port pricing and public investment in port and hinterland capacity," Working Papers 2007019, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender, 2007. "Private port pricing and public investment in port and Hinterland capacity," Working Papers Department of Economics ces0708, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Das, Satya P., 1997. "Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 173-188, August.
- Takahashi, Takaaki, 2004. "Spatial competition of governments in the investment on public facilities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 455-488, July.
- Simme J Veldman & Ewout H Bückmann, 2003. "A Model on Container Port Competition: An Application for the West European Container Hub-Ports," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 5(1), pages 3-22, March.
- Mori, Tomoya & Nishikimi, Koji, 2002. "Economies of transport density and industrial agglomeration," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 167-200, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:ewikln:2013_013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabine Williams)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.