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Divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty

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  • Ziss, Steffen

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  • Ziss, Steffen, 1999. "Divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(8), pages 1163-1187, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:17:y:1999:i:8:p:1163-1187
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. C.C. von Weizsaker, 1980. "A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 399-420, Autumn.
    2. Anne T. Coughlan & Birger Wernerfelt, 1989. "On Credible Delegation by Oligopolists: A Discussion of Distribution Channel Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(2), pages 226-239, February.
    3. Marius Schwartz & Earl A. Thompson, 1986. "Divisionalization and Entry Deterrence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 307-321.
    4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    5. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-559, August.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    7. Reitman, David, 1993. "Stock Options and the Strategic Use of Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 513-524, June.
    8. Polasky, Stephen, 1992. "Divide and conquer On the profitability of forming independent rival divisions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 365-371, November.
    9. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-236, March.
    10. Corchon, Luis C., 1991. "Oligopolistic competition among groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-3, May.
    11. Lafontaine, Francine & Slade, Margaret E, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    12. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
    13. Baye, Michael R. & Crocker, Keith J. & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 429-435, March.
    14. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    15. Kai-Uwe Kuhn, 1997. "Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
    16. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    17. Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 465-499.
    18. E. C. H. Veendorp, 1991. "Entry Deterrence, Divisionalization, and Investment Decisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 297-307.
    19. Lin, Y Joseph, 1988. "Oligopoly and Vertical Integration: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 251-254, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ziss, Steffen, 2001. "Horizontal mergers and delegation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 471-492, March.
    2. Ziss, Steffen, 2007. "Hierarchies, intra-firm competition and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 237-260, April.

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