On the competitive effects of divisionalization
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- Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel, 2001. "Divisionalization with spatial differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1297-1313, September.
- Bru, Lluís & de Haro, José-Manuel Ordóñez & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 2001. "Divisionalization in Vertical Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Tsygankova, Marina, 2010. "When is a break-up of Gazprom good for Russia?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 908-917, July.
- Miguel González-Maestre, 1993. "Divisionalization In Markets With Hetergeneous Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Marina Tsygankova, 2007. "When is Mighty Gazprom Good for Russia?," Discussion Papers 526, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 1997. "On merger profitability in a Cournot setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-79, January.
- Antonio, TESORIERE, 2007. "Allocating cost reducing investments over competing divisions," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007021, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
More about this item
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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