IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

When is a break-up of Gazprom good for Russia?

Listed author(s):
  • Tsygankova, Marina
Registered author(s):

    In the late 1990s, several proposals for a structural reform that would bring competition and market prices to the Russian gas industry were intensely debated. Splitting up Russian gas monopolist Gazprom into several producing companies was a considered option. In this paper, I examine theoretically and numerically how a split-up of Gazprom would affect Russian national welfare. Results show that under the current gas market structures in Europe and Russia, the split-up of Gazprom's monopoly might not be beneficial for Russia. However, analysis in the paper indicates that the market shares that Gazprom has in both Russian domestic and European gas markets are important in determining whether Gazprom's dominance is supported under the national welfare criteria. When Gazprom has small market share in Europe and large market share in Russia, a break-up of Gazprom might plausibly result in increase of Russian national welfare.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140-9883(10)00030-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Energy Economics.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (July)
    Pages: 908-917

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:32:y:2010:i:4:p:908-917
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eneco

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window

    1. Mohammed A. Al-Sahlawi, 1989. "The Demand for Natural Gas: A Survey of Price and Income Elasticities," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 77-90.
    2. Rolf Golombek & Eystein Gjelsvik & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 1995. "Effects of Liberalizing the Natural Gas Markets in Western Europe," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 85-112.
    3. Catherine Locatelli, 2003. "The viability of deregulation in the russian gas industry," Post-Print halshs-00001308, HAL.
    4. Fauli-Oller, Ramon, 1997. "On merger profitability in a Cournot setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-79, January.
    5. Stephen Polasky, 1993. "Divide And Conquer: On The Profitability Of Forming Independent Rival Divisions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 210, Boston College Department of Economics.
    6. Bo Andersson & Lars Bergman, 1995. "Market Structure and the Price of Electricity: An Ex Ante Analysis of the Deregulated Swedish Electricity Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 97-110.
    7. Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    8. Levin, Dan, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: The 50-Percent Benchmark," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1238-1245, December.
    9. Cheung, Francis K., 1992. "Two remarks on the equilibrium analysis of horizontal merger," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 119-123, September.
    10. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
    11. Stern, Jonathan, 2005. "The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780197300312.
    12. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-236, March.
    13. Luis Corchón & Miguel González-Maestre, 1994. "On the competitive effects of divisionalization," Working Papers. Serie AD 1994-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    14. Ramón Faulí-Oller, 1997. "On merger profitability in a cournot setting," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    15. Miguel González-Maestre, 2000. "Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 321-338, 06.
    16. Hennessy, David A., 2000. "Cournot Oligopoly Conditions Under Which Any Horizontal Merger is Profitable," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1699, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    17. Golombec, R. & Gjelsvik, E. & Knut, E. & Rosendahl, E., 1996. "Increased Competition on the Supply Side on the Western European Natural Gas Merket," Memorandum 11/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    18. David G. Tarr & Peter D. Thomson, 2004. "The Merits of Dual Pricing of Russian Natural Gas," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(8), pages 1173-1194, 08.
    19. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2002. "A Political Economic Approach to the Domestic Airline Merger Phenomenon," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 36(1), pages 27-48, January.
    20. Holtsmark, Bjart & Maestad, Ottar, 2002. "Emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol--effects on fossil fuel markets under alternative regimes," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 207-218, February.
    21. Bergman, Lars & Andersson, Bo, 1995. "Market Structure and the Price of Electricity: An ex ante Analysis of the deregulated Swedish Electricity Market," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 47, Stockholm School of Economics.
    22. Spanjer, Aldo, 2007. "Russian gas price reform and the EU-Russia gas relationship: Incentives, consequences and European security of supply," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 2889-2898, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:32:y:2010:i:4:p:908-917. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.