On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road
We study the extended Chinese postman (CP) cooperative game induced by a connected, weighted, undirected graph G, wherein a postman, starting from a post office location, needs to traverse all edges wherein players reside, before returning to the post-office. We characterize the graphs associated with all CP games in which the players on a road pay exactly the cost of the road at each core point, regardless of the number of players residing on the road, the location of the post-office and the edge-weight functions. Here, a road is a maximal path all of whose interior vertices have a degree equal to two in G. For this class of games, the core and nucleolus are Cartesian products of CP games induced by simple cyclic graphs, the core is determined by at most 2n-1 constraints and the nucleolus can be computed in time.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Other publications TiSEM ab187dab-1b5b-40c3-a673-8, School of Economics and Management.
- Hamers, Herbert & Borm, Peter & van de Leensel, Robert & Tijs, Stef, 1999. "Cost allocation in the Chinese postman problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 153-163, October.
- Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-81026 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jeroen Kuipers & Ulrich Faigle & Walter Kern, 2001. "On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 79-98.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-80680 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hamers, H.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & van den Leensel, A. & Tijs, S.H., 1999. "Cost allocation in the Chinese postman problem," Other publications TiSEM 5da2ea14-2fdf-4d1f-8b60-2, School of Economics and Management.
- Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154217 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hamers, Herbert, 1997. "On the concavity of delivery games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 445-458, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:427-438. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.