IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiucen/f343286b-7f46-4c60-94b3-a7f12c8424fe.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations

Author

Listed:
  • Fernández, C.
  • Borm, P.E.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This note introduces a new monotonicity property for sequencing situations. A sequencing rule is called drop out monotonic if no player will be worse off whenever one of the players decides to drop out of the queue before processing starts. This intuitively appealing property turns out to be very strong: we show that there is at most one rule satisfying both stability and drop out monotonicity. For the standard model of linear cost functions, the existence of this rule is established. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Fernández, C. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Drop Out Monotonic Rules for Sequencing Situations," Discussion Paper 2002-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f343286b-7f46-4c60-94b3-a7f12c8424fe
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/542241/51.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    2. Curiel, I. & Pederzoli, G. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "Sequencing games," Other publications TiSEM cd695be5-0f54-4548-a952-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    4. Curiel, Imma & Pederzoli, Giorgio & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Sequencing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 344-351, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fragnelli, V. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. & Tijs, S.H., 2006. "Convex Games with Countable Number of Players and Sequencing Situations," Discussion Paper 2006-119, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2007. "Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 15(1), pages 78-88, July.
    3. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Valeri Vasil’ev, 2007. "Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(2), pages 349-364, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    queueing theory; game theory;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f343286b-7f46-4c60-94b3-a7f12c8424fe. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman). General contact details of provider: http://center.uvt.nl .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.