Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility
We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of \Pi-balanced, totally \Pi-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.
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