Stable Allocations of Risk
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- Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, & Laszlo A. Koczy, 2007. "Stable Allocations of Risk," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0704, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á., 2007. "Stable allocations of risk," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
References listed on IDEAS
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"Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective,"
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- Péter Csóka & Jean-Jacques Herings & László Kóczy, 2006. "Coherent Measures of Risk from a General Equilibrium Perspective," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0611, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, revised 30 Aug 2006.
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More about this item
KeywordsCoherent Measures of Risk; Risk Allocation Games; Totally Balanced Games; Exact Games;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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