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The selectope for cooperative games

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Derks

    () (Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Hans Haller

    () (Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Hans Peters

    () (Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Derks & Hans Haller & Hans Peters, 2000. "The selectope for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 23-38.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38
    Note: Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999
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