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The selectope for cooperative games

  • Jean Derks

    ()

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Hans Haller

    ()

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Hans Peters

    ()

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 23-38

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38
Note: Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999
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