IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Bargaining Sets of Voting Games

  • Bezalel Peleg

    ()

  • Peter Sudholter

    ()

Let A be a finite set of m � 3 alternatives, let N be a finite set of n � 3 players and let R n be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Throughout most of the paper the considered voting system is the majority rule. Let u N be a profile of utility functions for R N. Using a -effectiveness we define the NTU game V uN and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m = 3 and it may be empty for m � 4. Moreover, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m � 5 and it may be empty for m � 6. Moreover, we prove the following startling result: The Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of R N is nonempty, provided that k � n + 2. We also compute the NTU games which are derived from choice by plurality voting and approval voting, and we analyze some interesting examples.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp376.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp376.

as
in new window

Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376
Contact details of provider: Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem
Phone: +972-2-6584135
Fax: +972-2-6513681
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Peleg, Bezalel & Sudholter, Peter, 2005. "On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1060-1068, December.
  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ilan Nehama)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.