Between LIberalism and Democracy
We study a class of voting rules that bridge between majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. We characterize axiomatically a family of rules parameterized by the weight each individual has in determining his or her qualification. In one extreme case, the Liberal Rule, each individual's qualification is determined by her. In the other, an individual's qualification is determined by a majority. We also propose a formalization of self-determination, and apply it in a characterization of the Liberal Rule.
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- Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991.
"Voting by Committees,"
Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
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