Between Liberalism and Democracy
We study a class of voting rules that bridge between majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. We characterize axiomatically a family of rules parameterized by the weight each individual has in determining his or her qualification. In one extreme case, the Liberal Rule, each individual's qualification is determined by her. In the other, an individual's qualification is determined by a majority. We also propose a formalization of self-determination, and apply it in a characterization of the Liberal Rule.
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| Date of creation: | Oct 1998 |
| Handle: | RePEc:osu:osuewp:98-18 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: 410 Arps Hall 1945 North High Street Columbus, Ohio 43210-1172
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991.
"Voting by Committees,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
- Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
- Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Razzolini, Laura, 1997. "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 74-95, January.
- A. Rubinstein & A. Kasher, 1998. "On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s5, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Riley, Jonathan, 1989. "Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(02), pages 121-166, October.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C., 1986. "Algebraic aggregation theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 63-77, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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