The bargaining set of a large game
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References listed on IDEAS
- Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2003. "Cores and stable sets of finite dimensional games," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 07-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Amarante, Massimiliano, 2014.
"A characterization of exact non-atomic market games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 59-62.
- Massimiliano AMARANTE, 2013. "A Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games," Cahiers de recherche 12-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- AMARANTE, Massimiliano, 2013. "A Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games," Cahiers de recherche 2013-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
More about this item
KeywordsMas-Colell bargaining set; Maximal excess game; Core-equivalence; Thin games; Market games; Lyapunov convexity theorem; C71;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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