Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley , and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz . We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our .ndings.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory|
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- Alain Chateauneuf & Fabio Macheronni & Massimo Marinacci & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2005. "Monotone continuous multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177057, HAL.
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ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series
09-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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- Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy, 1999. "The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14.
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