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The Core of Large TU Games

Author

Listed:
  • Larry G. Epstein

    () (University of Rochester)

  • Massimo Marinacci

    () (University of Torino)

Abstract

For non-atomic TU games nu satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of nu. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either core(nu) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of $\nu $. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry G. Epstein & Massimo Marinacci, 2000. "The Core of Large TU Games," RCER Working Papers 469, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:469
    as

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    File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_469.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Sergiu & Neyman, Abraham, 1988. "Values of non-atomic vector measure games : Are they linear combinations of the measures?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 31-40, February.
    2. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    3. Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy, 1999. "The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14.
    4. Larry G. Epstein, 1999. "A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 579-608.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    core; transferable utility; non atomic game;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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