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Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games

Author

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  • Massimiliano Amarante
  • Luigi Montrucchio

Abstract

We study the equivalence between the MB-set and the core in the general context of games with a measurable space of players. In the first part of the paper, we study the problem without imposing any restriction on the class of games we consider. In the second part, we apply our findings to specific classes of games for which we provide new equivalence results. These include non-continuous convex games, exact non-atomic market games and non-atomic non-exact games. We also introduce, and characterize, a new class of games, which we call thin games. For these, we show not only that the MB-set is equal to the core, but also that it is the unique stable set in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Finally, we study the relation between thin games, market games and convex games.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano Amarante & Luigi Montrucchio, 2007. "Mas-Colell Bargaining Set of Large Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 63, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:63
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mas-Colell Bargaining Set; maximal excess game; core-equivalence; thin games; market games; convex games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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