On the coincidence between the Shimomuras bargaining sets and the core
A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets de ned by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this aim, a set of payo vectors, called max-payo vectors, are introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
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