On the coincidence of the core and the bargaining sets
We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we sufficiently raise the worth of the grand coalition (the efficiency level). This coincidence result does not hold for other well-known bargaining sets like the Mas-Colell bargaining set and its variants.
Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
- Marc Meertens & J. A. M. Potters & J. H. Reijnierse, 2007. "On Bargaining Sets In Symmetric Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 199-213.
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