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On the coincidence of the core and the bargaining sets

Author

Listed:
  • Josep M Izquierdo

    (University of Barcelona)

  • Carles Rafels

    (University of Barcelona)

Abstract

We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we sufficiently raise the worth of the grand coalition (the efficiency level). This coincidence result does not hold for other well-known bargaining sets like the Mas-Colell bargaining set and its variants.

Suggested Citation

  • Josep M Izquierdo & Carles Rafels, 2012. "On the coincidence of the core and the bargaining sets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2035-2043.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00366
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1997. "Quasi-Cores in Bargaining Sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 283-302.
    2. TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
    3. Peter Sudhölter & Jos A. M. Potters, 2001. "The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 117-139.
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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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