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Cooperation and allocation

Author

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  • Hendrickx, R.L.P.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

This thesis deals with various models of cooperation, including games with transferable utility, games with nontransferable utility, bankruptcy situations, communication situations, spillover games and sequencing situations. The focus is on analysing rules for dividing the profits of cooperation. This analysis is performed in terms of properties that one might require of such an allocation mechanism. In addition, properties of the underlying situations and games are studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2004. "Cooperation and allocation," Other publications TiSEM ab33e762-204c-46e2-86b1-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ab33e762-204c-46e2-86b1-062ca89f61c4
    Note: Dissertation
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/594587/hendrickx.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. TamÂs Solymosi, 1999. "On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 229-240.
    2. Winter, Eyal, 1992. "The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 132-144, January.
    3. Marco Slikker, 2000. "Inheritance of properties in communication situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(2), pages 241-268.
    4. Stefan Wintein & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Marieke Quant, 2006. "Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 63(3), pages 413-426, July.
    5. Suijs, Jeroen & Borm, Peter, 1999. "Stochastic Cooperative Games: Superadditivity, Convexity, and Certainty Equivalents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 331-345, May.
    6. Judith Timmer & Peter Borm & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Convexity In Stochastic Cooperative Situations," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 25-42.
    7. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    8. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    9. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
    10. Bas van Velzen & Herbert Hamers, 2003. "On the balancedness of relaxed sequencing games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 57(2), pages 287-297, May.
    11. Thijssen, J.J.J. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Borm, P.E.M., 2002. "Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour," Discussion Paper 2002-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. repec:spr:compst:v:57:y:2003:i:2:p:287-297 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodney Beard, 2011. "The river sharing problem : A review of the technical literature for policy economists," Post-Print hal-00827354, HAL.
    2. Beard, Rodney & McDonald, Stuart, 2005. "Dynamic Recontracting of Water Rights," 2005 Conference (49th), February 9-11, 2005, Coff's Harbour, Australia 137781, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.

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