The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by Hart and Mas-Colell (1985) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values for coalition structure, namely, Aumann and Dreze's (1974) generalization of the Shapley value and Owen's (1977) value for games with coalition structure.
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