The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists
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- Rodney Beard, 2011. "The river sharing problem : A review of the technical literature for policy economists," Post-Print hal-00827354, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Nadine Wittmann, 2014. "A Microeconomic Perspective on Water Resources Management: Analyzing the Effects on Optimal Land Rents Along a River Basin," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(5), pages 1309-1325, March.
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- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Maria Gomez-Rua & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," ThE Papers 13/03, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1301, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
- Nadine Wittmann, 2014. "A Note on Distortional Distributional Effects in River Basin Discharge Permit Trade," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(1), pages 279-285, January.
- Wittmann Nadine, 2013. "A microeconomic analysis of the socio-economic situation along the Kat River Water Basin: Comment," Agrekon, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(2), pages 128-135, June.
More about this item
KeywordsRiver sharing problem; Bankruptcy; Cooperative game theory; Water resouyrce allocation; distributive justice;
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- B23 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-11-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-11-07 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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