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The Cost Assignment of the Cooperative Water Resource Development: A Game Theoretical Approach


  • Mitsuo Suzuki

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

  • Mikio Nakayama

    (Toyama University)


As the demand for natural resources intensifies so too the costs of further exploitation of these resources become enormous. These enormous costs in turn require the development of a given resource to be a cooperative venture among several participants, each of whom must be assured that the costs and benefits of the venture will be "fairly" distributed among them. It is at this point that the theory of cooperative games may offer guidelines as to what is fair or not fair to each participant or player in a given cost allocation. To illustrate an application of cooperative game theory in assigning "fair" costs and benefits to the participants in a cooperative venture we will consider a problem in water resource development.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitsuo Suzuki & Mikio Nakayama, 1976. "The Cost Assignment of the Cooperative Water Resource Development: A Game Theoretical Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(10), pages 1081-1086, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:22:y:1976:i:10:p:1081-1086

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    Cited by:

    1. Seemanta Bhagabati & Akiyuki Kawasaki & Mukand Babel & Peter Rogers & Sarawut Ninsawat, 2014. "A Cooperative Game Analysis of Transboundary Hydropower Development in the Lower Mekong: Case of the 3S Sub-basins," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(11), pages 3417-3437, September.
    2. Rodney Beard, 2011. "The river sharing problem : A review of the technical literature for policy economists," Post-Print hal-00827354, HAL.
    3. Gerichhausen, M. & Berkhout, E.D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Manyong, V.M., 2009. "A quantitative framework to analyse cooperation between rural households," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 173-185, July.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    5. Sexton, Richard J., 1991. "Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    6. Gerichhausen, M. & Berkhout, E.D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Manyong, V.M., 2008. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Analyse Cooperation between Rural Households in Northern Nigeria," Discussion Paper 2008-62, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Oishi, Takayuki & Nakayama, Mikio & Hokari, Toru & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2016. "Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 44-53.
    8. Ruperto P. Majuca, 2014. "Optimal solution to cybercrimes: lessons from law and economics," Philippine Review of Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society, vol. 51(1), pages 84-116, June.
    9. Soltani, Arezoo & Sankhayan, Prem Lall & Hofstad, Ole, 2016. "Playing forest governance games: State-village conflict in Iran," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 251-261.
    10. Milind Dawande & Srinagesh Gavirneni & Mili Mehrotra & Vijay Mookerjee, 2013. "Efficient Distribution of Water Between Head-Reach and Tail-End Farms in Developing Countries," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 15(2), pages 221-238, May.

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