Monotone continuous multiple priors
We show that the monotone continuity condition introduced by Arrow (1970) is the behavioral counterpart of countable additivity and weak compactness of the set of priors in a maxmin expected utility model. This generalizes Arrow's original result, who considered the special case of a singleton set of priors. Several other convenient technical properties of the set of priors, like non-atomicity, are studied and their behavioral counterparts are provided.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2005, 26 (4), pp.973-982. <10.1007/s00199-004-0540-2>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00177057|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2005. "Stable cores of large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 189-213, 06.
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