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Monotone Continuous Multiple Priors

Author

Listed:
  • Massimo Marinacci
  • Fabio Maccheroni
  • Alain Chateauneuf
  • Jean-Marc Tallon

Abstract

We show that the monotone continuity condition introduced by Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970) is the behavioral counterpart of countable additivity (and relative weak compactness) in a multiple priors model. This generalizes their original result, in which the special case of a singleton set of priors is considered. Further extending their results, we provide a behavioral counterpart for the convex rangedness of the priors (both considered singularly and as a vector measure).

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Marinacci & Fabio Maccheroni & Alain Chateauneuf & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2003. "Monotone Continuous Multiple Priors," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 30-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:icr:wpmath:30-2003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2005. "Stable cores of large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 189-213, June.
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