Monotone continuous multiple priors
In a multiple priors model á la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we provide necessary and sufficient behavioral conditions ensuring the countable additivity and non-atomicity of all priors. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2005. "Stable cores of large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 189-213, 06.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:973-982. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.