Monotone continuous multiple priors
In a multiple priors model á la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we provide necessary and sufficient behavioral conditions ensuring the countable additivity and non-atomicity of all priors. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2005. "Stable cores of large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(2), pages 189-213, 06.
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