On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.
|Date of creation:||May 2004|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, vol. 41, pp. 1060-1068.|
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- Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.