The nucleolus of a standard tree game revisited: a study of its monotonicity and computational properties
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Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "Bargaining Sets of Voting Games," Discussion Paper Series dp376, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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