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Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach

Author

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  • David Lowing

    (University of Paris-Saclay
    Kyushu University)

  • Makoto Yokoo

    (Kyushu University)

Abstract

A Sharing value for transferable utility games allocates the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the players within the coalition’s support. Such allocation is conducted in accordance with a specific sharing system that defines the Sharing value. In this paper, we extend Sharing values to multi-choice games. Multi-choice games represent a generalization of transferable utility games, wherein players can choose from multiple activity levels. Unlike transferable utility games, there is no straightforward method to interpret the support of a coalition in a multi-choice game. This complicates the process of distributing the Harsanyi dividend of a multi-choice coalition. We explore three possible interpretations of the support of a multi-choice coalition. Based on these interpretations, we derive three families of Sharing values for multi-choice games. To carry out this study, we examine both novel and classical axioms for multi-choice games, thereby providing an axiomatic foundation for each of these families of values.

Suggested Citation

  • David Lowing & Makoto Yokoo, 2025. "Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(2), pages 1-32, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00952-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00952-4
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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