IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04097838.html

Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels

Author

Listed:
  • David Lowing

    (Kyushu University)

  • Kevin Techer

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper analyzes cooperation situations between heterogeneous players. It considers two types of heterogeneity. First, the players are differentiated with respect to a priority structure. This structure captures asymmetries between players, which may reflect exogenous rights, different needs, merit, or hierarchical constraints. Second, each player may have different cooperation possibilities represented by a set of activity levels. To analyze these situations, we enrich the model of multi-choice games, which is a natural extension of transferable utility games, with a priority structure. A new value on the class of multi-choice games with a priority structure is introduced. To accommodate the different activity levels and the asymmetries between players, this value follows an allocation process based on a lexicographic procedure. New axioms for multi-choice games with a priority structure are introduced. These axioms endogenously determine the lexicographic procedure used to define the value. Two axiomatic characterizations of this value are provided.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Lowing & Kevin Techer, 2022. "Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels," Post-Print hal-04097838, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04097838
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102740
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lowing, David & Munich, Léa & Techer, Kevin, 2025. "Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Lowing, David & Techer, Kevin, 2025. "Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    3. David Lowing, 2023. "Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 320(1), pages 261-291, January.
    4. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04018735 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Takaaki Abe & David Lowing & Satoshi Nakada & Kevin Techer, 2025. "The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-29, June.
    6. David Lowing & Makoto Yokoo, 2025. "Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(2), pages 1-32, December.
    7. Songtao He & Erfang Shan & Yuxin Sun, 2025. "Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 1-16, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04097838. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.