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Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value

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  • Songtao He

    (Shanghai University)

  • Erfang Shan

    (Shanghai University)

  • Yuxin Sun

    (Shanghai University)

Abstract

The Priority value (Béal et al. in Int J Game Theory 51:431–450, 2022) is an allocation rule for TU-games with a priority structure, which distributes the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the set of its priority players. In this paper we propose two variants of the differential marginality of mutually dependent players axiom for TU-games with a priority structure, and extend the classical axiom of balanced contributions to TU-games with a priority structure. We provide several new characterizations of the Priority value which invoke these modified axioms and the standard axioms: efficiency, the null player property, the priority player out and the null player out.

Suggested Citation

  • Songtao He & Erfang Shan & Yuxin Sun, 2025. "Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 1-16, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:50:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10878-025-01340-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-025-01340-0
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