The Myerson value for union stable structures
We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship with graph communication situations and conference structures à la Myerson. Characterizations of the Myerson value in this context are provided using the concept of basis for union stable systems. Moreover, TU-games restricted by union stable systems generalizes graph-restricted games and games with permission structures. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001
Volume (Year): 54 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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