Modeling a Multi-Choice Game Based on the Spirit of Equal Job opportunities
The H&R multi-choice Shapley value defined by Hsiao and Raghavan for multi-choice cooperative game is redundant free. If the H&R value is used as the solution of a game, there won't be any objection to a player's taking redundant actions. Therefore, the spirit of the law on equal job opportunities is automatically fulfilled.
|Date of creation:||06 May 2009|
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- Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 1993. "A Shapley Value for Games with Restricted Coalitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(4), pages 351-60.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru & Raghavan, T E S, 1992. "Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 301-12.
- Calvo, Emilio & Santos, Juan Carlos, 2000. "A value for multichoice games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 341-354, November.
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