Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking
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- DEHEZ Pierre, & GINSBURGH Victor,, 2018. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," CORE Discussion Papers 2018012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2019. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Working Papers of BETA 2019-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, IsraÃ«l, 2012.
"Shapley Ranking of Wines,"
Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 169-180, November.
- GINSBURGH, Victor & ZANG, Israël, 2012. "Shapley ranking of wines," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2509, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Victor Ginsburgh & ISRAEL Zang, 2012. "Shapley Ranking of Wines," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2012-051, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- José Alcantud & Annick Laruelle, 2014. "Dis&approval voting: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, June.
- Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2010. "Framed-field experiments on approval voting in political contexts. Some teachings," Post-Print halshs-00512525, HAL.
- François Maniquet & Philippe Mongin, 2015. "Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 519-532, March.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051.
- Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff, 2015. "The paradox of grading systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 193-210, December.
- Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 101-120, November.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607.
- Pierre Dehez, 2017. "On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-36, September.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005. "Collective choice under dichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 165-184, June.
More about this item
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2018-04-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2018-04-30 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2018-04-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2018-04-30 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2018-04-30 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2018-04-30 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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