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The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function

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  • Ritu Dutta

    (Dibrugarh University)

  • Souvik Roy

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Surajit Borkotokey

    (Dibrugarh University)

Abstract

We introduce a cardinal social preference rule (CSPR) which accounts for interpersonal comparisons of alternatives in groups and satisfies several desirable properties. The proposed rule transforms voters’ individual ordinal preferences to obtain a score for each alternative given by the generalized Shapley value of cooperative games with transferable utilities. Since every CSPR induces an ordinal social preference rule (OSPR) in a natural way, the score vector, we propose in our model, induces a weak preference on the set of alternatives. The proposed CSPR is characterized by using some intuitive axioms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ritu Dutta & Souvik Roy & Surajit Borkotokey, 2023. "The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 277-300, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:32:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10726-022-09809-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-022-09809-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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