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Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election

Author

Listed:
  • Antoinette Baujard
  • Frédéric Gavrel
  • Herrade Igersheim
  • Jean-François Laslier
  • Isabelle Lebon

Abstract

Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment which used various evaluation scales, conducted during the first round of the 2012 French presidential election. Invitations to participate in the study were extended to around 5,000 voters in three cities, and the experiment attracted 2,340 participants. Basing our argument on the ranks, relative scores, and grade profiles of candidates, we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the official, two-round voting rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers of BETA 2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2013-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    2. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who's favored by Evaluative Voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French Presidential Election," Post-Print halshs-00950309, HAL.
    3. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
    4. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2011. "A Framed-field experiment on Approval voting and Evaluation voting," Post-Print halshs-00564256, HAL.
    5. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    6. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.
    7. Claude Hillinger, 2005. "The Case for Utilitarian Voting," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 23, pages 295-321.
    8. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Thomas Senne, 2011. "The Political Supply in the 2007 French Presidential Elections: An Analysis Based on Experimental Data," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 149-186.
    9. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Vote par approbation, vote par note. Une expérimentation lors de l'élection présidentielle du 22 avril 2012," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 64(2), pages 345-356.
    10. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
    12. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2011. "Reconstructing preferences in a voting context," Post-Print halshs-00601279, HAL.
    13. Gaertner, Wulf & Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "A general scoring rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 193-196.
    14. repec:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:08 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "On the Possibility of Democracy and Rational Collective Choice," Discussion Papers in Economics 429, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    16. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors des élections présidentielles françaises du 22 avril 2007. Premiers résultats," Post-Print halshs-00294481, HAL.
    17. repec:spr:stchwe:978-3-642-02839-7 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Granić, Đura-Georg, 2017. "The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 21-38.
    2. Antoinette Baujard, 2015. "How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting," Post-Print halshs-01211532, HAL.
    3. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L., 2014. "Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory," MPRA Paper 62938, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jan 2015.
    4. Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
    5. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers of BETA 2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    7. Laruelle, Annick, 2018. "Voting and expressing dissatisfaction: an experiment during the 2017 French Presidential election," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2018-106, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    8. Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff, 2015. "The paradox of grading systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 193-210, December.
    9. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    10. Matías Núñez & Jean Laslier, 2014. "Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 313-340, February.
    11. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Savadogo, Zoïnabo & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L., 2014. "Median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking: new prospects," MPRA Paper 64731, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 2014.
    12. Andreas Darmann & Julia Grundner & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Consensus in the 2015 Provincial Parliament Election in Styria, Austria: Voting Rules,Outcomes, and the Condorcet Paradox," Graz Economics Papers 2017-13, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    13. Antonin Macé, 2015. "Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum?," AMSE Working Papers 1544, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised 29 Oct 2015.
    14. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0472-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Savadogo, Zoïnabo & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L., 2014. "New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking," MPRA Paper 64155, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Dec 2014.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; In Situ Experiment; Evaluative Voting; Approval Voting; Two-round system.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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