IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gat/wpaper/1729.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting

Author

Listed:
  • Antoinette Baujard

    (Univ Lyon, UJM Saint-Etenne, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint- Etienne, France)

  • Frédéric Gavrel

    (CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie and Condorcet Center)

  • Herrade Igersheim

    (CNRS and Beta (UMR 7522), University of Strasbourg)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (CNRS and Paris School of Economics (UMR 8545))

  • Isabelle Lebon

    (CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie, and Condorcet Center)

Abstract

During the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, participants in an in situ experiment were invited to vote according to “evaluative voting”, which involves rating the candidates using a numerical scale. Various scales were used: (0,1), (-1,0,1), (0,1,2), and (0,1,...,20). The paper studies scale calibration effects, i.e., how individual voters adapt to the scale, leading to possibly different election outcomes. The data show that scales are not linearly equivalent, even if individual ordinal preferences are not inconsistent. Scale matters, notably because of the symbolic power of negative grades, which does not affect all candidates uniformly.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2017. "How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting," Working Papers 1729, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1729
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2017/1729.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.
    2. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    3. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
    4. Jean-François Laslier & André Blais & Damien Bol & Sona N Golder & Philipp Harfst & Laura B Stephenson & Karine Van der Straeten, 2015. "The EuroVotePlus experiment," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 601-615, December.
    5. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon & Frédéric Gavrel & Jean-François Laslier, 2014. "Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election," Post-Print halshs-01113068, HAL.
    6. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    7. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon & Frédéric Gavrel & Jean-François Laslier, 2014. "Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01113068, HAL.
    8. Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.
    9. W. M. Gorman, 1968. "The Structure of Utility Functions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(4), pages 367-390.
    10. Karine van Der Straeten & Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Strategic Voting in Multiwinner Elections with Approval Balloting: An Application to the 2011 Regional Government Election in Zurich," Post-Print halshs-02103123, HAL.
    11. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers of BETA 2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    12. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
    13. Gaertner, Wulf & Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "A general scoring rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 193-196.
    14. Pivato, Marcus, 2014. "Formal utilitarianism and range voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 50-56.
    15. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers hal-00803024, HAL.
    16. Antoinette Baujard, 2014. "Individual behavior under evaluative voting. A comparison between laboratory and In Situ Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00981556, HAL.
    17. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2014. "Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election," Working Papers halshs-01090234, HAL.
    18. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    19. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    20. Hatem Smaoui & Dominique Lepelley, 2013. "Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux : étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 123(6), pages 827-850.
    21. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(1), pages 53-89, January.
    22. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01245549 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Eric Maskin, 1978. "A Theorem on Utilitarianism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(1), pages 93-96.
    24. Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "On the Possibility of Democracy and Rational Collective Choice," Discussion Papers in Economics 429, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    25. Antonin Macé, 2015. "Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum?," AMSE Working Papers 1544, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 29 Oct 2015.
    26. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon, 2020. "Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting," Working Papers halshs-02926780, HAL.
    2. Andreas Darmann & Christian Klamler, 2023. "Does the rule matter? A comparison of preference elicitation methods and voting rules based on data from an Austrian regional parliamentary election in 2019," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 63-87, October.
    3. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon, 2021. "Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 803-834, May.
    4. Antoinette Baujard, 2021. "Values in Welfare economics," Working Papers 2112, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    5. Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers 1938, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    6. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020. "On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 289(2), pages 227-241, June.
    7. Darmann, Andreas & Grundner, Julia & Klamler, Christian, 2019. "Evaluative voting or classical voting rules: Does it make a difference? Empirical evidence for consensus among voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 345-353.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
    2. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon, 2020. "Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting," Working Papers halshs-02926780, HAL.
    3. Antonin Macé, 2015. "Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum?," AMSE Working Papers 1544, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 29 Oct 2015.
    4. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Isabelle Lebon, 2021. "Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 803-834, May.
    5. Igersheim, Herrade & Durand, François & Hamlin, Aaron & Laslier, Jean-François, 2022. "Comparing voting methods: 2016 US presidential election," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    6. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020. "On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 289(2), pages 227-241, June.
    7. Darmann, Andreas & Grundner, Julia & Klamler, Christian, 2019. "Evaluative voting or classical voting rules: Does it make a difference? Empirical evidence for consensus among voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 345-353.
    8. Herrade Igersheim & François Durand & Aaron Hamlin & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Comparing Voting Methods : 2016 US Presidential Election," PSE Working Papers halshs-01972097, HAL.
    9. Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    10. Herrade Igersheim & François Durand & Aaron Hamlin & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Comparing Voting Methods : 2016 US Presidential Election," Working Papers halshs-01972097, HAL.
    11. repec:ehu:ikerla:25736 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2014. "Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election," Working Papers halshs-01090234, HAL.
    13. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers of BETA 2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    14. Granić, Đura-Georg, 2017. "The problem of the divided majority: Preference aggregation under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 21-38.
    15. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
    16. Dodge Cahan & Arkadii Slinko, 2018. "Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 259-279, August.
    17. Tanya Gibbs & Henry W. Chappell, Jr., 2021. "Elections with Multiple Positive and Negative Votes," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-47, December.
    18. José Alcantud & Annick Laruelle, 2014. "Dis&approval voting: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, June.
    19. Bol, Damien & Blais, André & Coulombe, Maxime & Laslier, Jean-François & Pilet, Jean-Benoit, 2020. "Choosing an Electoral Rule," SocArXiv rm2tq, Center for Open Science.
    20. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    21. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluative Voting; Range voting; Approval voting; In Situ Experiment; Calibration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1729. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nelly Wirth The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Nelly Wirth to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gateefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.