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Comparing voting methods: 2016 US presidential election

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  • Igersheim, Herrade
  • Durand, François
  • Hamlin, Aaron
  • Laslier, Jean-François

Abstract

This paper presents data from a survey leading up to the 2016 US presidential elections. Participants were asked their opinions about the candidates and were also asked to vote according to three alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, one facing a set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson, and Stein) and the other a set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do US voters use these alternative rules? (2) What kinds of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, are favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of eliminated alternatives? Our results provide evidence that, according to all standard criteria computed on individual preferences, be there utilitarian or of the Condorcet type, the same candidate (Sanders) wins. Evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump).

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  • Igersheim, Herrade & Durand, François & Hamlin, Aaron & Laslier, Jean-François, 2022. "Comparing voting methods: 2016 US presidential election," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:71:y:2022:i:c:s0176268021000562
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102057
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea C. Hupman & Jay Simon, 2023. "The Legacy of Peter Fishburn: Foundational Work and Lasting Impact," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 1-15, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Approval voting; Range voting; Instant runoff; Strategic voting; US Presidential election;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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