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Was Bolsonaro’s 2018 electoral victory an institutional accident?

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  • Maciel, Marcelo Veloso

Abstract

Presidential Elections are critical moments for polyarchical systems, particularly in contexts of high social tension. In this regard, the 2018 presidential election in Brazil, which used a two-round system, is a significant case study. Intriguingly, the most divisive candidates went to the second round. Was this an institutional accident? Pairwise and positional voting procedures embody different generalizations of a majoritarian credo that underpins such elections. The paper mobilizes both perspectives and, using representative survey data, reconstructs the top four preferences of the Brazilian electorate a week before the election. The analysis reveals that the electoral winner, Jair Messias Bolsonaro – despite being a divisive candidate – was a Condorcet Winner and a Borda Winner. Conversely, the second-round loser, Fernando Haddad, was a Condorcet Loser. Thus, Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018 was not an institutional accident. The paper also explores possible alternative scenarios under different feasible sets of candidates through simulations, contributing to a deeper understanding of the role of decision procedures in critical junctures.

Suggested Citation

  • Maciel, Marcelo Veloso, 2024. "Was Bolsonaro’s 2018 electoral victory an institutional accident?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:83:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000508
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102548
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