Imperfectly Informed Voters and Strategic Extremism
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- Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Imperfectly Informed Voters And Strategic Extremism," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58, pages 439-471, May.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2013. "Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 938.13, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
References listed on IDEAS
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- Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Strategic Extremism: Why Republicans and Democrats Divide on Religious Values," NBER Working Papers 10835, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2012.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 121-130.
- Dimitrios Xefteris & Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2017.
"Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 357-381, May.
- Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Spatial Competition," TSE Working Papers 16-618, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Dimitrios Xefteris & Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2017. "Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition," Post-Print hal-01634245, HAL.
- Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 05-2016, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsDownsian model; imperfect information; advantaged candidate; maximum differentiation;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-10-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-10-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-10-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-10-25 (Positive Political Economics)
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