Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non- policy advantage over the other candidate. We assume that voters have quadratic preferences over policies and that their ideal points are drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. In our equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. We show that this equilibrium exists if the number of voters is large enough relative to the size of the advantage.
|Date of creation:||10 Jan 2011|
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- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000.
"Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate,"
1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
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- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002.
"The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study,"
1138, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002. "The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 530.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 59, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January.
- Roland Kirstein & Georg v. Wangenheim, 2010. "A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201011, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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