Candidate reputations and the `incumbency effect'
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- Johansson, Per-Olov, 1982. "Cost-benefit rules in general disequilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 121-137.
- Roberts, Kevin W S, 1982. "Desirable Fiscal Policies under Keynesian Unemployment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-22, March.
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