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Competing for votes

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

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  • James F. Adams

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • James F. Adams, 2015. "Competing for votes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 12, pages 201-217, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adams, James & Merrill III, Samuel, 2009. "Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation: A Valence-Uncertainty Model," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 539-558, July.
    2. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
    3. Gilles Serra, 2011. "Why primaries? The party’s tradeoff between policy and valence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 21-51, January.
    4. Adams, James & Merrill, Samuel, 2006. "Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 403-417, August.
    5. Thomas R. Palfrey, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(1), pages 139-156.
    6. Barnett,William A. & Schofield,Norman & Hinich,Melvin (ed.), 1993. "Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521428316.
    7. Jac C. Heckelman, 2004. "A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(1_2), pages 87-103, January.
    8. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1975. "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(1), pages 27-49.
    9. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
    10. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.
    11. Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, 2006. "Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 547-569, June.
    12. Barnett,William A. & Schofield,Norman & Hinich,Melvin (ed.), 1993. "Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521417815.
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:02:p:490-498_14 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:cup:apsrev:v:57:y:1963:i:02:p:368-377_24 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Eiselt, H.A. & Marianov, Vladimir, 2020. "Maximizing political vote in multiple districts," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

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